Buckland identifies several types of information objects and the repositories that deal with them: "libraries deal with books...museums deal directly with physical objects." (352) Is it valuable to so clearly define our parameters when it comes to the type(s) of information-as-things that we work with? Is there, or should there, be room for ambiguity? Can museums also deal with data in the forms of bits and bytes, and libraries deal with objects?
How do representations' shortcomings, as described by Buckland on 354, affect the research value of ephemeral objects - e.g., art installations, theatre, dance, or even photographs and films attempting to document events? How about with digitization - what information is lost when we turn a physical artifact into an item in a digital collection?
Buckland seems particularly focused upon supporting his view of information-as-thing. But aren't most activities around information management centered around "information-as-thing"? The management of documents, data, objects - aren't these all the representations of information as thing that Buckland is describing?
1. I am interested in the way that Buckland categorizes the idea of “information-as-thing” as being “evidence”. In his argument he declares that evidence is an appropriate term because it denotes something related to understanding, something which if “found and correctly understood, could change one’s knowledge, one’s beliefs, concerning some matter.” In what way could a photograph for example be “found and correctly understood” outside of the context of some other document or text accompanying it? Visual materials such as a photographs lack narrative quality in most cases, making it impossible for them to be “correctly understood” in any explicit way. This could also be argued generally for the visual arts I believe. Does anyone else find issue with this definition?
2. Buckland seems to take a democratic approach towards defining what constitutes information objects. To what degree are these definitions comprehensive enough to avoid being situational? For example, one person’s document is another person’s garbage. Another question arises concerning the ability of a person to sense objects in the environment and how that might change these definitions. Can an object be described as “evidence” if one cannot see or hear it, for example if I am blind or deaf?
3. I am interested by the question that Buckland raises about having to come to consensus about what to store in retrieval-based information systems. From my experience with art museums, the motivation to store visual materials is often very politicized and has a lot more to do with the donor’s preferences and financial contribution than any consensus about relevancy or value. It often seems that the motivation for information systems is to preserve value but how might they also artificially create value? I am interested in discussing how information-systems become politicized and information professionals are concerned with the issue?
1. Though the author of the paper presented a number of evidences to illustrate that information is a thing, however, I still doubt the value of discussing the implication of the word information. Why do we have to figure out the definition of information, an ambiguous word? Or, who or what can benefit from the final conclusion that information is a thing or a process? 2. As mentioned in previous papers, there is a model known as DIKW describing the relationships among data, information, knowledge and wisdom. Generally, most of specialists agree that the latter element is a higher abstract level of the former one in the model. Then, here is a problem: if information is a thing, then, is knowledge a thing? Is wisdom a thing? If not, what is the boundary between data, a kind of thing, and knowledge? 3. In the classification of information introduced in the paper, the author thought data is a type of information. This notion definitely arises chaos. In the DIKW pyramid, data is the foundation of information and they are not overlapped. Data is thought as meaningless while information carries meanings. By what criteria the author considers data is an information type?
1. Buckland mentions potentially informative objects that we can infer an existence for, “as when detectives search, more or less systematically, for clues.” (Buckland, 356). There are other instances where we can infer some informative element may be present but beyond observation. Would be it fair to refer to such phenomena as “potential information”?
2. Buckland refers to accounts of an event as “no more than hearsay” (356) and holds that other representations of events are still unable to store the event itself. Does this make it fully impossible for persons, even perhaps those who were present, to have a full understanding of an event? If we attempt replication in order to clarify a limited understanding, what ethical issues should we confront?
3. Buckland writes at length about the utility and inaccuracy of using “information” to mean artifacts containing information. (353) There is of course information to be gleaned from the artifact in question, its makers, history, and condition which are information and can influence the information recorded. There is also often metadata to organize the artifact into a collection of other information, which leaves a seeker-of-knowledge with several layers to penetrate in order to reach the information sought. Are these multiple layers part of the same information “thing” or separate linked pieces?
1. In Buckland’s article, he states that “a key characteristic of ‘information-as-knowledge’ is that it’s intangible: one cannot touch it or measure it in any direct way” (1). While I agree about the assertion that you can’t touch knowledge, I’m not so sure about the measuring. Isn’t measuring knowledge exactly what exams and other similar assignments are meant to do? Can’t a person’s knowledge about any given subject (or every subject) be measured by asking that person to demonstrate what they know about it? I understand that such a demonstration may not be the most direct way of measurement (it’s not filling a cup with water), but it does give a very clear idea of how much knowledge any one individual has – doesn’t it?
2. Buckland also claims in his article that information is synonymous with evidence (3). He really even goes so far as to suggest that information and evidence are the same thing. His basis for comparison is that both information and evidence lead people to believe, accept, or even denounce the validity of an event, object, person, etc . . . However, is evidence truly information, or does it just give information? If it gives information, does that, in turn, make it information? Or, to move even further out, can the relationship between evidence and information be described like the “all squares are rectangles, but not all rectangles are squares” rule in geometry?
3. Buckland describes at length the many different kinds of things that can be considered information or informative. In one example, he uses a tree. He states, “One does not normally think of trees as being information, but trees are informative in two ways,” and then goes on to describe the use of trees for lumber and the way a tree’s age can be determined by counting the rings on its trunk (6). While this example certainly proves that trees can be informative – does it really prove that trees are information? I feel that Buckland assumes that everyone knows a tree’s age can be counted by its rings, but what if someone doesn’t? Is that tree still information for that person? Furthermore, even if someone does know about tree rings and age, they are looking at the tree rings and accessing that information from an earlier time (from when they learned it). So – is the tree really information? Or is it just sending signals that cause previously learned information to be accessed?
1) On the first page Buckland lists one of the principal uses of information as "information as knowledge", which is defined as 'the notion of information as that which reduces uncertainty could be viewed as a special case of "information as knowledge." '. Wouldn't that phrasing better fit data and its relationship with information? Data reduces uncertainty, thus becomes information. Also, why have knowledge be used as a descriptor for information, when knowledge is seen as greater on the DIKW hierarchy?
2) On page 354, it is noted that great confusion exists due to assumptions about data and document, and it is advised one should 'not assume any firm distinction between data, document, and text'. Are we causing our own confusion by forcing a small pool of words to define a multitude of concepts, according to our own personal values?
3) Why is there seemingly little use of the term "natural sign" or the creation of a term that encompasses the philosophical idea? There certainly are a lot of sources of information that are physical objects, that do provide information, but do so without communicative intent.
1) The article makes the argument that information must be observable, and thus that what constitutes “information” can change according to observation techniques and advances in technology. Is this perhaps a helpful distinction between “information” and “truth”? Is information merely the fallible human perception of “truth”?
2) Buckland argues that the difference between an object (or specimen) and a document is the fact that a document is intended to convey or represent information, whereas an object/specimen must be observed and documented in order for inferences to be made. What, then, to make of human-made artifacts whose intent is no longer clear? How does one infer “intent”?
3) In the process of positioning information as evidentiary, Buckland describes literature as “sources for the study of language and literature.” (353) This seems to reduce the informational value of literature, especially creative literature, to commentary on its own medium. (Similarly, he seems to subscribe to the common misconception of photography as objective documentation of fact.) Can’t fiction or poetry also inform the reader in ways that are not merely “evidentiary”? Is linguistic and historical content even the most important information contained within literary works? Buckland’s evidentiary theory of information would seem to preclude creative communication as “information” at all.
1. Buckland says that “a key characteristic of information as knowledge” is that it is intangible: one cannot touch or measure it any direct way.” I disagree. Things like textbooks or religious texts are definitely tangible knowledge. He even says that to communicate them (knowledge, belief, and opinion) “they have to be expressed, described, or represented in some physical way, as a signal, text, or communication.” Just as he has “information as a thing”, knowledge as a thing should be a part of his concept. With Buckland’s idea of intangibility in mind, do you think there are any examples of truly intangible knowledge?
2. On 354 Buckland writes about the confusion in trying to distinguish two types of retrieval processes. Those types, data retrieval and document retrieval, seem to be synonymous. Essentially data and documents are forms of texts. Is it really necessary to distinguish between data and document retrieval when essentially either method will most likely get one to their research destination? Aren’t all searches made about data or documents references of some kind?
3. Under the section “When is Information not Information?” on 356 Buckland comes to the conclusion that “if anything is, or might be, informative, then everything is, or might well be, information. In which case calling something information does little to define it. If everything is information, then being information is nothing special.” I say that everything is information. The distinctions one makes about what information is valuable, helpful, or implementable is what makes it special. It’s not necessarily what we call or how we define it, rather it all depends on the situation, context, or individual person and what they choose to do with the information after they have processed it. Is the idea that there is no clear definition of information actually a definer for information? Can’t we make it anything we want it to be?
1. The author identified three principal uses of the word "information" by referring to the Oxford English Dictionary, and I think it is reasonable to classify the meanings of "information" in a literary way. However, since we read several papers about the DIKW hierarchy, the term "information-as-knowledge" seems to make no sense. The author believed that we used "Information-as-knowledge" to denote that which is perceived in "the information-as process". Nonetheless, the car number I told my roommate today could meet this definition as well, but how can we call the car number "knowledge"?
2. In the part "Types of Information", the author tried to classified "Information as evidence" but I think it failed and was making chaos. First of all, data cannot be regarded as information because data itself has no meaning. Secondly, in my view, documents are parts of the object. Everything tangible can be called "object". Third, in the last paragraph in this part, the author demonstrated "data processed and assembled into a meaningful form" was a restricted definition by giving examples of fossils and footprints. However, (ignoring right or wrong this definition was) it is obvious that there was data presenting on fossils (like its size) which assembled into a meaningful form.
3. Talking about the information system, the author mentioned the comparative analysis of information storage and retrieval system. However, I think the different physical attributes could be finally stored in the system in one way: the data. Since this is an article wrote in 1991, I wonder the author maybe what to discuss the carrier of information rather than "information as thing".
1. I think that Buckland would have benefited from reading about the DIKW hierarchy. It seems hard to define information as thing, when you wouldn't be sure why you are doing it. In some respects, I think that the DIKW pyramid is a great guiding path. It can allow you to see where you are and where you have to go. Buckland discusses events, documents, discourse, but these are all things that pave the path from information to knowledge. If you use the DIKW hierarchy as a standard, why is it important to discuss information as thing if it's simply a milestone on the way to knowledge?
2. Buckland claims that "if an object is not representative of something, then it is not clear how far it can signify anything, i.e., to be informative" (p.355). But aren't somethings not seemingly "information" at first, but through application of knowledge they become information? For example, if you have an object of worth, but have no knowledge of what it is, how much it's worth, etc., and I am an expert and could identify said object, wouldn't that object then become a piece of information for you, the owner? Can you transfer knowledge to someone who doesn't have the right background/experience, or is that an example of when knowledge would transform into information?
3. When discussing documents (p. 355), Buckland writes that, often, people use things in a way that was never originally intended. We see this more and more when people find new and unexpected uses for various technologies. Is there a time, though, when changing something's use or intended application would change the thing itself?
-Buckland states that, “it is wise not to assume any firm distinction between data, document, and text?” Is Buckland arguing, like Zins, that data should be interpreted as sets of signs?
-Buckland concludes that “if anything is, or might be, informative, then everything is, or might be, information.” It reminds me of theories pervasive in contemporary- the idea that every object and idea at your disposal is whatever you make of it. Thus is information is everything and thus nothing special isn’t the issue simply presenting and preserving what the human race deems most important?
-Buckland refers to recreated memories or representations of an event as “no more than heresay evidence.” (This paper is so wonderfully 90s) If there is no way to truly store an event, only subjective fragments, then no one, past or present, can have more than a limited understanding of that event. So how can an event ever be replicated?
1. The author identifies three kinds of information: Information-as-process, Information-as-knowledge, Information-as-thing. Is the information in Information-as-process the same information in Information-as-thing? For example, is the act of informing (Information-as-process) in studying the antelope same as the information of the antelope as an object?
2. What about emotions that are only sensible to the individual but not to others? For example, my girlfriend is unhappy with me, but she looks okay and behaves normally. Is this hidden emotion information to me? First, emotion is not a thing, it is a feeling and intangible. Second, it fits into the criteria of “Being information is situational”. 1) It is pertinent to me, because I care about my girlfriend. 2) It has the probability of being evidence. I may know where I did wrong to her. 3) The evidence is important. The well being of our relationship is important. 4) The combination of these issues matters. The unshown emotion of my girlfriend is representation of our relationship in a specific time. But it just doesn’t represent to me.
3. Under the premises of being information by consensus, which means it satisfies “Being information is situational” and it is useful depends a compounding of subjective judgements. But under the consensus, different individuals have slight disagreements on the information as thing. Would the information held by these different individuals the same information? For example, both person A and B believes the same evidence drawn from object X. But A and B have different ideas how to use evidence. Would the evidence be different information for A and B?
1. While pondering how Buckland begins his summary – with the concept that there are numerous definitions for information - it occurred to me that all of the different disciplinarians would benefit from getting together and submitting their definitions for data, information (including information-as-process, information-as-knowledge, information-as-thing if needed), knowledge and wisdom. Once we get all of the pieces of the various disciplines, might we be able to come up with an encompassing definition?
2. This is the first article that we read that also introduces evidence as part of information. This seems to complicate the definition even more, requiring more of the term information while at the same time limiting its being. Can information only exist if it is evidence?
3. With other articles and Milan Zeleny publishing the DIKW pyramid model in 1987, this article feels as though a defense against DIKW theory. It seems Buckland is trying to have information take on the roles of data and knowledge, which the DIKW theory separates.
1.p.354 Is a document anything that represents its object? Is it useful to categorize documents into mediums? 2. p.356 "If everything is information, then being information is nothing special." I agree. Then what is a pithy term that adequately describes the informationess of things other than the term "information"? 3. p.359 "Varieties of 'information-as-thing' vary in their physical characteristics and so are not equally suited for storage and retrieval. There is, however, considerable scope for using representations instead." Can't representations also vary in their physical characteristics? Does this mean agreeing on a common medium of representation is the fix?
1. The only thing that I took away from Buckland's article is that everything is or has the potential to be information depending upon the situation. This seems like a fairly obvious conclusion to come to. Are there really professionals in the field of Information Science that disagree with the idea that everything has the potential to be informative?
2. The idea that someone must be aware of a thing for it to become informative is something that I disagree with. That someone knows that something exists does not change the object in any way. It was the same before and after it was discovered. Therefore, the properties of that thing that make it informative are the same before and after.
3. I disagree with Buckland when he says "Determining what might be informative is a difficult task." If everything is information then everything is informative. Determining what might be informative to a particular situation on the other hand could be very difficult task. Is it not the task of every person in the pursuit of knowledge to wade through everything (information) to find the things that are informative to their specific situation?
1. I found Buckland’s discussion regarding the nature of a document interesting. Should “document” be used to describe those things which are text-based, or can objects be included? It can be argued that objects are documentation of something, so therefore should they be considered a document? Buckland also mentions that objecting the use of the terms “document” and “information” does not remove the need for some term to describe these things. Any ideas on what this term could be?
2. On page 355, Buckland talks about the concept of “representations”. He mentions texts as being representative of objects and objects being representative of something else. I don’t quite understand the point he is trying to make within this paragraph and how it relates to his overall theme.
3. I’m interested in this idea of what is not information. Buckland writes that “if everything is information, then being information is nothing special”. That’s a pretty bold claim. Where do people stand on this concept? Is everything information or not?
1. "The distinction between intangibles (knowledge and information-as-knowledge) and tangibles (information-as-thing) is central...If you can touch it or measure it directly, it is not knowledge, but must be some physical thing, possibly information-as-thing (p352)." In order to differentiate information-as knowledge and information-as-thing, the author assumes anything tangible must be physical and information-as-thing is the representation of knowledge. I don't agree with that. I think information is something intangible. Although we can use words and communications to represent it, we cannot say those words or communications are information. Just like we stand in front of the mirror, the mirror can reflect us, but our images in the mirror are not real us.
2. The author introduces several types of information in this article: data, text, documents, objects, events and draws the conclusion:”if anything is, or might be, informative, then everything is, or might well be, information” (p356). I cannot agree with that. I think information is something more subjective than objective. People have their own definitions of information, so we cannot say everything is information. What do you think?
3. When the author talks about information as evidence, he mentions “the term evidence implies passiveness” (p353). I think it depends on our views about ‘evidence’ whether evidence is passive or active. I mean we should receive the information actively. We should try to use information to change our world, not just wait to be impacted by the information. What do you think?
Buckland puts forth the idea that information-as-thing is interchangeable with evidence. He further presents that thought by saying that information/evidence are things from which one becomes informed(353). Since becoming “informed” seems to be subjective depending upon the evidence present does information-as-thing retain a sort of observer effect? Meaning does renaming information as evidence make a difference in how information “exists” at a given point in time and for different individuals?
Buckland’s thoughts on data, document, and text being almost indistinguishable from one another presents another problem in organizing information or evidence. Without clear defining terms for each of these things how does someone working within the information field create an accurate collection of information? Or is the fact that there exists no concrete delineation a strength of the information field?
In describing the nature of information, Buckland seems to have reinforced the fact that information remains mercurial by nature. As we move forward within Information Science, would any subject or discipline better served by using broad terms for documents, texts, data or even information itself?
1.In this article, Michael lists data as a type of Information. However as we have learnt from the DIKW hierarchy, the information is the end-product of the data process. Do these two opinion conflicts with each other? How could we explain Michael’s idea.
2.Michael assumes that untrue information is not information. In some cases, rumors are not untrue information, but we are still able to learn something from a rumor. Sometimes, the rumor could even lead us to the truth, since it drown our curiosity. So could we still think the untrue information is not information.
3.Michael concluded that we are unable to say confidently of anything that it could not be information with an example of a tree. He regards a tree as information, as a tree could be informative about tree and are evidence of variations in the weather. Is there a problem? Because it is not he tree itself is information, but it is the tree that carries the information.
1. Under information as evidence, Buckland argues that if something cannot be viewed as having the characteristics of evidence, it is difficult to consider it as information. The basic definition of information is processed data. How can we expect every sentence or paragraph to have evidence? Is it necessary that, in this case, any sentence in a particular text which has no evidence is not information?
2.On page 355,Documents are defined as something that takes the traditional form of text on paper, should contain potentially informative objects and they are information. Going by this, a book is also a document. A book serves as a source of knowledge. Can this contradiction of a book being both information and knowledge be justified?
3. On page 356, Buckland points out that if anything is information, then everything is,or maybe will be, information. The example of a tree as information is interesting.Can we take the example of a random number(ex. 3 or 5). Now how can this be information? If this denotes a count or age or any particular quantity, it can be referred to as information? But ultimately, isn't this just data? Is the author being too generalized when he says anything can be information?
1. The author starts this article by bringing up three concepts- Information-as-process, information-as-knowledge and information-as-thing. So according to the cited definitions about all the three concepts, could we put them into a pyramid diagram with information-as-process at the bottom and information-as-thing at the top to describe the development of information? Or could we say it reflects people`s increasing requirements from bottom to top? 2. When talking about types of information, the author listed data, text and document, objects as the primary sources. So is there clear boundary between data and text and document according to the author`s statement? And can we say objects are meaningless unless they turn into documents- that mean someone might create some description or representation of objects? 3. In the What is a Document section, the author mentioned a thought about defining “document”- a generic term to denote any physical information resource rather than to limit it to text-bearing objects. I think extending the definition of document is right, but how far we should go before ensuring it is within the scope of “information-as-thing”?
1. Buckland, in the top paragraph on page 353, notes that "we are restricting our attention to physical things and physical events. Some people would say that some of their knowledge comes from paraphysical sources, notably from divine inspiration. Others would deny any such nonphysical source of information, but, to the extent that it may exist, information science would have to be incomplete if it were excluded." She then demurs to consider the question further, "not knowing what to say." This brings up what I think is a funny and interesting question regarding definitions of authorship and how that intersects with cataloging. Do we list the author of the Bible as anonymous, multiple anonymous, God, God and his prophets, or what? Who is the authority? Who decides who is the authority? Mustn't we limit ourselves to physical sources?
2. In her discussion of objects and whether they can be "documents," Buckland includes a preliminary consideration of the possibility of creating a "virtual collection" comprised of references to objects, using people and buildings as examples. Can a building be a document? A text? I'm reminded here of a book I have titled "How to Read a Church," which instructs the reader in how to identify and understand various conventions of ecclesiastical architecture. Buckland explores this problem by discussion that a map is a document, but a globe is not, nor is a model train. Where do we draw the line to define a document? What is the difference between an object and a document? Between a document and a text? Between a text and a work?
3. Following from this, she also touches upon the possibility of considering events as documents. Could events not conceivably also be be data, evidence, information? How much do the definitions of these concepts ellide and/or collapse when considering outlier "documents" like objects and events? On page 356 Buckland says that "though events cannot be retrieved, there is some scope for recreating them." Following on our small group discussion last week of the looming omnipresence of data-collecting technology (QR code readers, debit-card swipes, emails, facial recognition technology, store purchase info collection for marketing data mining, etc., etc.), I wonder: how are these questions changed by the amount of data we can now collect on even the most mundane, daily events? If recreation of an event becomes possible, due to technology, will events be documents? How would they be made discrete for cataloging, retrieval, or cross-referencing?
1. In the part relating to types of information, the author firstly says that data is an apt term that has been processed in some way for use. It seems that this thought is much different with what recent scholars believe, that data is unorganized and useless. And sometimes, the differences between past articles and recent ones are so obvious that makes them even more like conflicts. I am wondering what attitude should we hold when we read these articles from past? And, on which part should we focus in a past article?
2. My second question is relating to the context on page 353. The author believes that 'If it has value as information concerning something, then it would appear to have value as evidence of something'. I am wondering that will it have different effects to prove something if information is transformed to evidence in different formats?
3. On page 355-356, the author asserts that we also learn from events, and we use events in three different ways: evidence associated with events, representations of the event, and recreations. I agree with this point of view, but I would like to know that can we use this method to categorize all other types of information?
Q1 On the page 3, the author talks about information as evidence. To bolster this, the author gives examples to demonstrate that our knowledge and opinions are affected by what we see, read, hear, and experience. These are referred as evidence, as the author says. And then, the author also comments that if something cannot be viewed as having the characteristics of evidence, then it is difficult to see how it could be regarded as information. So my question is how information and evidence are related? Does all evidence subject to information or equal to information? Or does information make up to evidence?
Q2 On the page 5, the author concludes that documentation, as a form of information can include object and evidence. And object can divided into artifacts intended to constitute discourse, artifacts that were not so intended, and objects that are not artifacts at all. All of these become or not evidence within certain context. But how could we set boundary on these? How could we decide one object to be or not to be a piece of evidence based on different culture and background? If it is varied from one to another one, why we need to define the difference of object?
Q3 In the end, the author talks about information system and noted that information system can deal directly only with "information-as-thing". The author also gives several use of information system. My question is, can information system be a kind of "information-as-thing" if we see it as a whole part provides amount of information?
In this article the author describes four different types of information-as-thing. These four types of information are data, documents, objects, and events. What are the major differences between data, documents, objects, and events? Can an object be a document or vise versa? Are documents and data distinct things or is a document merely a method of storing data?
The author of this article suggests that information-as-thing is the same as evidence. He states that information-as-thing is the same as evidence because both of them require inferences to be made from them. Is this true? For something to be information does it require that some form of inference be derived from it?
This article discusses the idea of copies. The author states that when one is discussing copies there are two different terms to use, token and different types. Different types documents are two documents that are not the same as each other, whereas token documents are entirely identical. Is it important when discussing documents that are copies to determine which of the documents is the original? When two or more documents are created are the same, even if they are token documents, is there any importance in determining which is the original document or is the information contained in the document all that matters?
1. Buckland rarely uses the word “record” in his discussion of what physical items count as information or a document. On page 355, Buckland asks “What generic term for information things is wide enough to include, say, museum objects and other scholarly evidence, as well as text-bearing objects”? Could the term be ‘record’? Is a record the same as a document? Can the terms be used interchangeably?
2. Buckland writes on page 353 that evidence and information are synonyms, like how museum pieces are evidence of nature and society. Is it possible for an object to not be evidence of anything because a person cannot derive any information from it? If a person unearths something from the ground but can’t tell what it is or what it is made of, is it providing evidence of anything? Isn’t some knowledge in a person’s head needed to recognize that something is providing information to be able to interpret it as evidence?
3. On page 355 Buckland divides objects into “artifacts intended to constitute discourse,….artifacts that were not so intended,…and objects that are not artifacts at all.” What makes an object an artifact or not? I am confused by what definition Buckland is using for an artifact because he does not describe it.
1. I'm interested in the idea of information processing presented on page 352. Is it widely accepted within the IS field that the process of finding information can be as helpful or informative as having the results of the process? 2. Though Buckland suggests that's it's not helpful, I found his explanation of what's not information to be the opposite (p. 356). I'm curious as to why more scholarship doesn't include the idea that the nomenclature of information actually does little to define what it is? 3. This article does a good job of highlighting the fact that information is a human construct. With this, I found the section on information by consensus to be intriguing (p. 357). As a society, isn't all information that is perceived as fact, really just information by consensus?
1. On page 356 in the section “When information is not information?” the author concludes “we are unable to say confidently of anything that it could not be information.” How much do you agree with this statement? How does Fricke’s argument against the DIKW hierarchy fit with this idea of information?
2. How do the concepts of “information-as-process”, “information-as-knowledge”, and “information-as-thing” fit into the DIKW hierarchy?
3. Looking at the multiple definitions of information from the Fricke article and Zins article, how does “information-as-thing” fit into these ideas of information?
1. Why is it that only a “dedicated documentalist” would view an antelope as a document? I thought the case made was pretty convincing. Could we not consider a zoo to be a kind of archive for zoologists? Natural history museums, in all of their taxidermied glory, are archives, aren’t they? Must something be dead in order to be a document? Or is it just not useful to think of these places in such terms?
2. What is the relevance of the discussion of copies and types and tokens? Was there a question as to their status as documents or information?
3. Buckland proposes that “although all information systems deal directly with ‘information-as-thing’ we might create some order within this area if we could identify a subset of information-handling activities that are concerned with information only in this sense.” He then goes on to list examples that I’m completely unfamiliar with, which makes it hard to understand what he’s proposing. What would this subset look like? I’m very curious.
1. Buckland proposes that evidence is a synonym for information-as-thing, but is information-as-thing necessarily evidence?
2. The author is unable to come up with anything that could not be considered information. Do you agree or disagree? Give examples.
3. In his discussion of types and tokens, Buckland points out that "two physically identical documents are regarded as different if they occur in different places in the original order of the files." Why would this be so?
1. How might Buckland respond to Martin Frické's critique of the DIKW hierarchy? Given his use of data as a subset of information, would he also shirk the traditional DIKW model?
2. Given that archives and archivists comprise large portions of the field of information studies today, why then might "information-as-thing" be called into question?
3. Buckland states that "objects of which nobody is aware cannot be information, while hastening to add that they might well become so when someone does become aware of them" (356). How can this superposition of information/non-information exist? Would objects of which no one is yet aware be considered undiscovered or unobserved data--is unobserved data even within the realm of possibility?
Buckland identifies several types of information objects and the repositories that deal with them: "libraries deal with books...museums deal directly with physical objects." (352) Is it valuable to so clearly define our parameters when it comes to the type(s) of information-as-things that we work with? Is there, or should there, be room for ambiguity? Can museums also deal with data in the forms of bits and bytes, and libraries deal with objects?
ReplyDeleteHow do representations' shortcomings, as described by Buckland on 354, affect the research value of ephemeral objects - e.g., art installations, theatre, dance, or even photographs and films attempting to document events? How about with digitization - what information is lost when we turn a physical artifact into an item in a digital collection?
Buckland seems particularly focused upon supporting his view of information-as-thing. But aren't most activities around information management centered around "information-as-thing"? The management of documents, data, objects - aren't these all the representations of information as thing that Buckland is describing?
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ReplyDelete1. I am interested in the way that Buckland categorizes the idea of “information-as-thing” as being “evidence”. In his argument he declares that evidence is an appropriate term because it denotes something related to understanding, something which if “found and correctly understood, could change one’s knowledge, one’s beliefs, concerning some matter.” In what way could a photograph for example be “found and correctly understood” outside of the context of some other document or text accompanying it? Visual materials such as a photographs lack narrative quality in most cases, making it impossible for them to be “correctly understood” in any explicit way. This could also be argued generally for the visual arts I believe. Does anyone else find issue with this definition?
ReplyDelete2. Buckland seems to take a democratic approach towards defining what constitutes information objects. To what degree are these definitions comprehensive enough to avoid being situational? For example, one person’s document is another person’s garbage. Another question arises concerning the ability of a person to sense objects in the environment and how that might change these definitions. Can an object be described as “evidence” if one cannot see or hear it, for example if I am blind or deaf?
3. I am interested by the question that Buckland raises about having to come to consensus about what to store in retrieval-based information systems. From my experience with art museums, the motivation to store visual materials is often very politicized and has a lot more to do with the donor’s preferences and financial contribution than any consensus about relevancy or value. It often seems that the motivation for information systems is to preserve value but how might they also artificially create value? I am interested in discussing how information-systems become politicized and information professionals are concerned with the issue?
1. Though the author of the paper presented a number of evidences to illustrate that information is a thing, however, I still doubt the value of discussing the implication of the word information. Why do we have to figure out the definition of information, an ambiguous word? Or, who or what can benefit from the final conclusion that information is a thing or a process?
ReplyDelete2. As mentioned in previous papers, there is a model known as DIKW describing the relationships among data, information, knowledge and wisdom. Generally, most of specialists agree that the latter element is a higher abstract level of the former one in the model. Then, here is a problem: if information is a thing, then, is knowledge a thing? Is wisdom a thing? If not, what is the boundary between data, a kind of thing, and knowledge?
3. In the classification of information introduced in the paper, the author thought data is a type of information. This notion definitely arises chaos. In the DIKW pyramid, data is the foundation of information and they are not overlapped. Data is thought as meaningless while information carries meanings. By what criteria the author considers data is an information type?
1. Buckland mentions potentially informative objects that we can infer an existence for, “as when detectives search, more or less systematically, for clues.” (Buckland, 356). There are other instances where we can infer some informative element may be present but beyond observation. Would be it fair to refer to such phenomena as “potential information”?
ReplyDelete2. Buckland refers to accounts of an event as “no more than hearsay” (356) and holds that other representations of events are still unable to store the event itself. Does this make it fully impossible for persons, even perhaps those who were present, to have a full understanding of an event? If we attempt replication in order to clarify a limited understanding, what ethical issues should we confront?
3. Buckland writes at length about the utility and inaccuracy of using “information” to mean artifacts containing information. (353) There is of course information to be gleaned from the artifact in question, its makers, history, and condition which are information and can influence the information recorded. There is also often metadata to organize the artifact into a collection of other information, which leaves a seeker-of-knowledge with several layers to penetrate in order to reach the information sought. Are these multiple layers part of the same information “thing” or separate linked pieces?
1. In Buckland’s article, he states that “a key characteristic of ‘information-as-knowledge’ is that it’s intangible: one cannot touch it or measure it in any direct way” (1). While I agree about the assertion that you can’t touch knowledge, I’m not so sure about the measuring. Isn’t measuring knowledge exactly what exams and other similar assignments are meant to do? Can’t a person’s knowledge about any given subject (or every subject) be measured by asking that person to demonstrate what they know about it? I understand that such a demonstration may not be the most direct way of measurement (it’s not filling a cup with water), but it does give a very clear idea of how much knowledge any one individual has – doesn’t it?
ReplyDelete2. Buckland also claims in his article that information is synonymous with evidence (3). He really even goes so far as to suggest that information and evidence are the same thing. His basis for comparison is that both information and evidence lead people to believe, accept, or even denounce the validity of an event, object, person, etc . . . However, is evidence truly information, or does it just give information? If it gives information, does that, in turn, make it information? Or, to move even further out, can the relationship between evidence and information be described like the “all squares are rectangles, but not all rectangles are squares” rule in geometry?
3. Buckland describes at length the many different kinds of things that can be considered information or informative. In one example, he uses a tree. He states, “One does not normally think of trees as being information, but trees are informative in two ways,” and then goes on to describe the use of trees for lumber and the way a tree’s age can be determined by counting the rings on its trunk (6). While this example certainly proves that trees can be informative – does it really prove that trees are information? I feel that Buckland assumes that everyone knows a tree’s age can be counted by its rings, but what if someone doesn’t? Is that tree still information for that person? Furthermore, even if someone does know about tree rings and age, they are looking at the tree rings and accessing that information from an earlier time (from when they learned it). So – is the tree really information? Or is it just sending signals that cause previously learned information to be accessed?
1) On the first page Buckland lists one of the principal uses of information as "information as knowledge", which is defined as 'the notion of information as that which reduces uncertainty could be viewed as a special case of "information as knowledge." '. Wouldn't that phrasing better fit data and its relationship with information? Data reduces uncertainty, thus becomes information. Also, why have knowledge be used as a descriptor for information, when knowledge is seen as greater on the DIKW hierarchy?
ReplyDelete2) On page 354, it is noted that great confusion exists due to assumptions about data and document, and it is advised one should 'not assume any firm distinction between data, document, and text'. Are we causing our own confusion by forcing a small pool of words to define a multitude of concepts, according to our own personal values?
3) Why is there seemingly little use of the term "natural sign" or the creation of a term that encompasses the philosophical idea? There certainly are a lot of sources of information that are physical objects, that do provide information, but do so without communicative intent.
1) The article makes the argument that information must be observable, and thus that what constitutes “information” can change according to observation techniques and advances in technology. Is this perhaps a helpful distinction between “information” and “truth”? Is information merely the fallible human perception of “truth”?
ReplyDelete2) Buckland argues that the difference between an object (or specimen) and a document is the fact that a document is intended to convey or represent information, whereas an object/specimen must be observed and documented in order for inferences to be made. What, then, to make of human-made artifacts whose intent is no longer clear? How does one infer “intent”?
3) In the process of positioning information as evidentiary, Buckland describes literature as “sources for the study of language and literature.” (353) This seems to reduce the informational value of literature, especially creative literature, to commentary on its own medium. (Similarly, he seems to subscribe to the common misconception of photography as objective documentation of fact.) Can’t fiction or poetry also inform the reader in ways that are not merely “evidentiary”? Is linguistic and historical content even the most important information contained within literary works? Buckland’s evidentiary theory of information would seem to preclude creative communication as “information” at all.
1. Buckland says that “a key characteristic of information as knowledge” is that it is intangible: one cannot touch or measure it any direct way.” I disagree. Things like textbooks or religious texts are definitely tangible knowledge. He even says that to communicate them (knowledge, belief, and opinion) “they have to be expressed, described, or represented in some physical way, as a signal, text, or communication.” Just as he has “information as a thing”, knowledge as a thing should be a part of his concept. With Buckland’s idea of intangibility in mind,
ReplyDeletedo you think there are any examples of truly intangible knowledge?
2. On 354 Buckland writes about the confusion in trying to distinguish two types of retrieval processes. Those types, data retrieval and document retrieval, seem to be synonymous. Essentially data and documents are forms of texts. Is it really necessary to distinguish between data and document retrieval when essentially either method will most likely get one to their research destination? Aren’t all searches made about data or documents references of some kind?
3. Under the section “When is Information not Information?” on 356 Buckland comes to the conclusion that “if anything is, or might be, informative, then everything is, or might well be, information. In which case calling something information does little to define it. If everything is information, then being information is nothing special.” I say that everything is information. The distinctions one makes about what information is valuable, helpful, or implementable is what makes it special. It’s not necessarily what we call or how we define it, rather it all depends on the situation, context, or individual person and what they choose to do with the information after they have processed it. Is the idea that there is no clear definition of information actually a definer for information? Can’t we make it anything we want it to be?
1. The author identified three principal uses of the word "information" by referring to the Oxford English Dictionary, and I think it is reasonable to classify the meanings of "information" in a literary way. However, since we read several papers about the DIKW hierarchy, the term "information-as-knowledge" seems to make no sense. The author believed that we used "Information-as-knowledge" to denote that which is perceived in "the information-as process". Nonetheless, the car number I told my roommate today could meet this definition as well, but how can we call the car number "knowledge"?
ReplyDelete2. In the part "Types of Information", the author tried to classified "Information as evidence" but I think it failed and was making chaos. First of all, data cannot be regarded as information because data itself has no meaning. Secondly, in my view, documents are parts of the object. Everything tangible can be called "object". Third, in the last paragraph in this part, the author demonstrated "data processed and assembled into a meaningful form" was a restricted definition by giving examples of fossils and footprints. However, (ignoring right or wrong this definition was) it is obvious that there was data presenting on fossils (like its size) which assembled into a meaningful form.
3. Talking about the information system, the author mentioned the comparative analysis of information storage and retrieval system. However, I think the different physical attributes could be finally stored in the system in one way: the data. Since this is an article wrote in 1991, I wonder the author maybe what to discuss the carrier of information rather than "information as thing".
1. I think that Buckland would have benefited from reading about the DIKW hierarchy. It seems hard to define information as thing, when you wouldn't be sure why you are doing it. In some respects, I think that the DIKW pyramid is a great guiding path. It can allow you to see where you are and where you have to go. Buckland discusses events, documents, discourse, but these are all things that pave the path from information to knowledge. If you use the DIKW hierarchy as a standard, why is it important to discuss information as thing if it's simply a milestone on the way to knowledge?
ReplyDelete2. Buckland claims that "if an object is not representative of something, then it is not clear how far it can signify anything, i.e., to be informative" (p.355). But aren't somethings not seemingly "information" at first, but through application of knowledge they become information? For example, if you have an object of worth, but have no knowledge of what it is, how much it's worth, etc., and I am an expert and could identify said object, wouldn't that object then become a piece of information for you, the owner? Can you transfer knowledge to someone who doesn't have the right background/experience, or is that an example of when knowledge would transform into information?
3. When discussing documents (p. 355), Buckland writes that, often, people use things in a way that was never originally intended. We see this more and more when people find new and unexpected uses for various technologies. Is there a time, though, when changing something's use or intended application would change the thing itself?
-Buckland states that, “it is wise not to assume any firm distinction between data, document, and text?” Is Buckland arguing, like Zins, that data should be interpreted as sets of signs?
ReplyDelete-Buckland concludes that “if anything is, or might be, informative, then everything is, or might be, information.” It reminds me of theories pervasive in contemporary- the idea that every object and idea at your disposal is whatever you make of it. Thus is information is everything and thus nothing special isn’t the issue simply presenting and preserving what the human race deems most important?
-Buckland refers to recreated memories or representations of an event as “no more than heresay evidence.” (This paper is so wonderfully 90s) If there is no way to truly store an event, only subjective fragments, then no one, past or present, can have more than a limited understanding of that event. So how can an event ever be replicated?
1. The author identifies three kinds of information: Information-as-process, Information-as-knowledge, Information-as-thing. Is the information in Information-as-process the same information in Information-as-thing? For example, is the act of informing (Information-as-process) in studying the antelope same as the information of the antelope as an object?
ReplyDelete2. What about emotions that are only sensible to the individual but not to others? For example, my girlfriend is unhappy with me, but she looks okay and behaves normally. Is this hidden emotion information to me? First, emotion is not a thing, it is a feeling and intangible. Second, it fits into the criteria of “Being information is situational”. 1) It is pertinent to me, because I care about my girlfriend. 2) It has the probability of being evidence. I may know where I did wrong to her. 3) The evidence is important. The well being of our relationship is important. 4) The combination of these issues matters. The unshown emotion of my girlfriend is representation of our relationship in a specific time. But it just doesn’t represent to me.
3. Under the premises of being information by consensus, which means it satisfies “Being information is situational” and it is useful depends a compounding of subjective judgements. But under the consensus, different individuals have slight disagreements on the information as thing. Would the information held by these different individuals the same information? For example, both person A and B believes the same evidence drawn from object X. But A and B have different ideas how to use evidence. Would the evidence be different information for A and B?
1. While pondering how Buckland begins his summary – with the concept that there are numerous definitions for information - it occurred to me that all of the different disciplinarians would benefit from getting together and submitting their definitions for data, information (including information-as-process, information-as-knowledge, information-as-thing if needed), knowledge and wisdom. Once we get all of the pieces of the various disciplines, might we be able to come up with an encompassing definition?
ReplyDelete2. This is the first article that we read that also introduces evidence as part of information. This seems to complicate the definition even more, requiring more of the term information while at the same time limiting its being. Can information only exist if it is evidence?
3. With other articles and Milan Zeleny publishing the DIKW pyramid model in 1987, this article feels as though a defense against DIKW theory. It seems Buckland is trying to have information take on the roles of data and knowledge, which the DIKW theory separates.
1.p.354 Is a document anything that represents its object? Is it useful to categorize documents into mediums?
ReplyDelete2. p.356 "If everything is information, then being information is nothing special." I agree. Then what is a pithy term that adequately describes the informationess of things other than the term "information"?
3. p.359 "Varieties of 'information-as-thing' vary in their physical characteristics and so are not equally suited for storage and retrieval. There is, however, considerable scope for using representations instead." Can't representations also vary in their physical characteristics? Does this mean agreeing on a common medium of representation is the fix?
1. The only thing that I took away from Buckland's article is that everything is or has the potential to be information depending upon the situation. This seems like a fairly obvious conclusion to come to. Are there really professionals in the field of Information Science that disagree with the idea that everything has the potential to be informative?
ReplyDelete2. The idea that someone must be aware of a thing for it to become informative is something that I disagree with. That someone knows that something exists does not change the object in any way. It was the same before and after it was discovered. Therefore, the properties of that thing that make it informative are the same before and after.
3. I disagree with Buckland when he says "Determining what might be informative is a difficult task." If everything is information then everything is informative. Determining what might be informative to a particular situation on the other hand could be very difficult task. Is it not the task of every person in the pursuit of knowledge to wade through everything (information) to find the things that are informative to their specific situation?
1. I found Buckland’s discussion regarding the nature of a document interesting. Should “document” be used to describe those things which are text-based, or can objects be included? It can be argued that objects are documentation of something, so therefore should they be considered a document? Buckland also mentions that objecting the use of the terms “document” and “information” does not remove the need for some term to describe these things. Any ideas on what this term could be?
ReplyDelete2. On page 355, Buckland talks about the concept of “representations”. He mentions texts as being representative of objects and objects being representative of something else. I don’t quite understand the point he is trying to make within this paragraph and how it relates to his overall theme.
3. I’m interested in this idea of what is not information. Buckland writes that “if everything is information, then being information is nothing special”. That’s a pretty bold claim. Where do people stand on this concept? Is everything information or not?
1. "The distinction between intangibles (knowledge and information-as-knowledge) and tangibles (information-as-thing) is central...If you can touch it or measure it directly, it is not knowledge, but must be some physical thing, possibly information-as-thing (p352)." In order to differentiate information-as knowledge and information-as-thing, the author assumes anything tangible must be physical and information-as-thing is the representation of knowledge. I don't agree with that. I think information is something intangible. Although we can use words and communications to represent it, we cannot say those words or communications are information. Just like we stand in front of the mirror, the mirror can reflect us, but our images in the mirror are not real us.
ReplyDelete2. The author introduces several types of information in this article: data, text, documents, objects, events and draws the conclusion:”if anything is, or might be, informative, then everything is, or might well be, information” (p356). I cannot agree with that. I think information is something more subjective than objective. People have their own definitions of information, so we cannot say everything is information. What do you think?
3. When the author talks about information as evidence, he mentions “the term evidence implies passiveness” (p353). I think it depends on our views about ‘evidence’ whether evidence is passive or active. I mean we should receive the information actively. We should try to use information to change our world, not just wait to be impacted by the information. What do you think?
Buckland puts forth the idea that information-as-thing is interchangeable with evidence. He further presents that thought by saying that information/evidence are things from which one becomes informed(353). Since becoming “informed” seems to be subjective depending upon the evidence present does information-as-thing retain a sort of observer effect? Meaning does renaming information as evidence make a difference in how information “exists” at a given point in time and for different individuals?
ReplyDeleteBuckland’s thoughts on data, document, and text being almost indistinguishable from one another presents another problem in organizing information or evidence. Without clear defining terms for each of these things how does someone working within the information field create an accurate collection of information? Or is the fact that there exists no concrete delineation a strength of the information field?
In describing the nature of information, Buckland seems to have reinforced the fact that information remains mercurial by nature. As we move forward within Information Science, would any subject or discipline better served by using broad terms for documents, texts, data or even information itself?
1.In this article, Michael lists data as a type of Information. However as we have learnt from the DIKW hierarchy, the information is the end-product of the data process. Do these two opinion conflicts with each other? How could we explain Michael’s idea.
ReplyDelete2.Michael assumes that untrue information is not information. In some cases, rumors are not untrue information, but we are still able to learn something from a rumor. Sometimes, the rumor could even lead us to the truth, since it drown our curiosity. So could we still think the untrue information is not information.
3.Michael concluded that we are unable to say confidently of anything that it could not be information with an example of a tree. He regards a tree as information, as a tree could be informative about tree and are evidence of variations in the weather. Is there a problem? Because it is not he tree itself is information, but it is the tree that carries the information.
1. Under information as evidence, Buckland argues that if something cannot be viewed as having the characteristics of evidence, it is difficult to consider it as information. The basic definition of information is processed data. How can we expect every sentence or paragraph to have evidence? Is it necessary that, in this case, any sentence in a particular text which has no evidence is not information?
ReplyDelete2.On page 355,Documents are defined as something that takes the traditional form of text on paper, should contain potentially informative objects and they are information. Going by this, a book is also a document. A book serves as a source of knowledge. Can this contradiction of a book being both information and knowledge be justified?
3. On page 356, Buckland points out that if anything is information, then everything is,or maybe will be, information. The example of a tree as information is interesting.Can we take the example of a random number(ex. 3 or 5). Now how can this be information? If this denotes a count or age or any particular quantity, it can be referred to as information? But ultimately, isn't this just data? Is the author being too generalized when he says anything can be information?
1. The author starts this article by bringing up three concepts- Information-as-process, information-as-knowledge and information-as-thing. So according to the cited definitions about all the three concepts, could we put them into a pyramid diagram with information-as-process at the bottom and information-as-thing at the top to describe the development of information? Or could we say it reflects people`s increasing requirements from bottom to top?
ReplyDelete2. When talking about types of information, the author listed data, text and document, objects as the primary sources. So is there clear boundary between data and text and document according to the author`s statement? And can we say objects are meaningless unless they turn into documents- that mean someone might create some description or representation of objects?
3. In the What is a Document section, the author mentioned a thought about defining “document”- a generic term to denote any physical information resource rather than to limit it to text-bearing objects. I think extending the definition of document is right, but how far we should go before ensuring it is within the scope of “information-as-thing”?
1. Buckland, in the top paragraph on page 353, notes that "we are restricting our attention to physical things and physical events. Some people would say that some of their knowledge comes from paraphysical sources, notably from divine inspiration. Others would deny any such nonphysical source of information, but, to the extent that it may exist, information science would have to be incomplete if it were excluded." She then demurs to consider the question further, "not knowing what to say." This brings up what I think is a funny and interesting question regarding definitions of authorship and how that intersects with cataloging. Do we list the author of the Bible as anonymous, multiple anonymous, God, God and his prophets, or what? Who is the authority? Who decides who is the authority? Mustn't we limit ourselves to physical sources?
ReplyDelete2. In her discussion of objects and whether they can be "documents," Buckland includes a preliminary consideration of the possibility of creating a "virtual collection" comprised of references to objects, using people and buildings as examples. Can a building be a document? A text? I'm reminded here of a book I have titled "How to Read a Church," which instructs the reader in how to identify and understand various conventions of ecclesiastical architecture. Buckland explores this problem by discussion that a map is a document, but a globe is not, nor is a model train. Where do we draw the line to define a document? What is the difference between an object and a document? Between a document and a text? Between a text and a work?
3. Following from this, she also touches upon the possibility of considering events as documents. Could events not conceivably also be be data, evidence, information? How much do the definitions of these concepts ellide and/or collapse when considering outlier "documents" like objects and events? On page 356 Buckland says that "though events cannot be retrieved, there is some scope for recreating them." Following on our small group discussion last week of the looming omnipresence of data-collecting technology (QR code readers, debit-card swipes, emails, facial recognition technology, store purchase info collection for marketing data mining, etc., etc.), I wonder: how are these questions changed by the amount of data we can now collect on even the most mundane, daily events? If recreation of an event becomes possible, due to technology, will events be documents? How would they be made discrete for cataloging, retrieval, or cross-referencing?
1. In the part relating to types of information, the author firstly says that data is an apt term that has been processed in some way for use. It seems that this thought is much different with what recent scholars believe, that data is unorganized and useless. And sometimes, the differences between past articles and recent ones are so obvious that makes them even more like conflicts. I am wondering what attitude should we hold when we read these articles from past? And, on which part should we focus in a past article?
ReplyDelete2. My second question is relating to the context on page 353. The author believes that 'If it has value as information concerning something, then it would appear to have value as evidence of something'. I am wondering that will it have different effects to prove something if information is transformed to evidence in different formats?
3. On page 355-356, the author asserts that we also learn from events, and we use events in three different ways: evidence associated with events, representations of the event, and recreations. I agree with this point of view, but I would like to know that can we use this method to categorize all other types of information?
Q1 On the page 3, the author talks about information as evidence. To bolster this, the author gives examples to demonstrate that our knowledge and opinions are affected by what we see, read, hear, and experience. These are referred as evidence, as the author says. And then, the author also comments that if something cannot be viewed as having the characteristics of evidence, then it is difficult to see how it could be regarded as information. So my question is how information and evidence are related? Does all evidence subject to information or equal to information? Or does information make up to evidence?
ReplyDeleteQ2 On the page 5, the author concludes that documentation, as a form of information can include object and evidence. And object can divided into artifacts intended to constitute discourse, artifacts that were not so intended, and objects that are not artifacts at all. All of these become or not evidence within certain context. But how could we set boundary on these? How could we decide one object to be or not to be a piece of evidence based on different culture and background? If it is varied from one to another one, why we need to define the difference of object?
Q3 In the end, the author talks about information system and noted that information system can deal directly only with "information-as-thing". The author also gives several use of information system. My question is, can information system be a kind of "information-as-thing" if we see it as a whole part provides amount of information?
In this article the author describes four different types of information-as-thing. These four types of information are data, documents, objects, and events. What are the major differences between data, documents, objects, and events? Can an object be a document or vise versa? Are documents and data distinct things or is a document merely a method of storing data?
ReplyDeleteThe author of this article suggests that information-as-thing is the same as evidence. He states that information-as-thing is the same as evidence because both of them require inferences to be made from them. Is this true? For something to be information does it require that some form of inference be derived from it?
This article discusses the idea of copies. The author states that when one is discussing copies there are two different terms to use, token and different types. Different types documents are two documents that are not the same as each other, whereas token documents are entirely identical. Is it important when discussing documents that are copies to determine which of the documents is the original? When two or more documents are created are the same, even if they are token documents, is there any importance in determining which is the original document or is the information contained in the document all that matters?
1. Buckland rarely uses the word “record” in his discussion of what physical items count as information or a document. On page 355, Buckland asks “What generic term for information things is wide enough to include, say, museum objects and other scholarly evidence, as well as text-bearing objects”? Could the term be ‘record’? Is a record the same as a document? Can the terms be used interchangeably?
ReplyDelete2. Buckland writes on page 353 that evidence and information are synonyms, like how museum pieces are evidence of nature and society. Is it possible for an object to not be evidence of anything because a person cannot derive any information from it? If a person unearths something from the ground but can’t tell what it is or what it is made of, is it providing evidence of anything? Isn’t some knowledge in a person’s head needed to recognize that something is providing information to be able to interpret it as evidence?
3. On page 355 Buckland divides objects into “artifacts intended to constitute discourse,….artifacts that were not so intended,…and objects that are not artifacts at all.” What makes an object an artifact or not? I am confused by what definition Buckland is using for an artifact because he does not describe it.
1. I'm interested in the idea of information processing presented on page 352. Is it widely accepted within the IS field that the process of finding information can be as helpful or informative as having the results of the process?
ReplyDelete2. Though Buckland suggests that's it's not helpful, I found his explanation of what's not information to be the opposite (p. 356). I'm curious as to why more scholarship doesn't include the idea that the nomenclature of information actually does little to define what it is?
3. This article does a good job of highlighting the fact that information is a human construct. With this, I found the section on information by consensus to be intriguing (p. 357). As a society, isn't all information that is perceived as fact, really just information by consensus?
1. On page 356 in the section “When information is not information?” the author concludes “we are unable to say confidently of anything that it could not be information.” How much do you agree with this statement? How does Fricke’s argument against the DIKW hierarchy fit with this idea of information?
ReplyDelete2. How do the concepts of “information-as-process”, “information-as-knowledge”, and “information-as-thing” fit into the DIKW hierarchy?
3. Looking at the multiple definitions of information from the Fricke article and Zins article, how does “information-as-thing” fit into these ideas of information?
1. Why is it that only a “dedicated documentalist” would view an antelope as a document? I thought the case made was pretty convincing. Could we not consider a zoo to be a kind of archive for zoologists? Natural history museums, in all of their taxidermied glory, are archives, aren’t they? Must something be dead in order to be a document? Or is it just not useful to think of these places in such terms?
ReplyDelete2. What is the relevance of the discussion of copies and types and tokens? Was there a question as to their status as documents or information?
3. Buckland proposes that “although all information systems deal directly with ‘information-as-thing’ we might create some order within this area if we could identify a subset of information-handling activities that are concerned with information only in this sense.” He then goes on to list examples that I’m completely unfamiliar with, which makes it hard to understand what he’s proposing. What would this subset look like? I’m very curious.
1. Buckland proposes that evidence is a synonym for information-as-thing, but is information-as-thing necessarily evidence?
ReplyDelete2. The author is unable to come up with anything that could not be considered information. Do you agree or disagree? Give examples.
3. In his discussion of types and tokens, Buckland points out that "two physically identical documents are regarded as different if they occur in different places in the original order of the files." Why would this be so?
1. How might Buckland respond to Martin Frické's critique of the DIKW hierarchy? Given his use of data as a subset of information, would he also shirk the traditional DIKW model?
ReplyDelete2. Given that archives and archivists comprise large portions of the field of information studies today, why then might "information-as-thing" be called into question?
3. Buckland states that "objects of which nobody is aware cannot be information, while hastening to add that they might well become so when someone does become aware of them" (356). How can this superposition of information/non-information exist? Would objects of which no one is yet aware be considered undiscovered or unobserved data--is unobserved data even within the realm of possibility?